Showing posts with label Finance/Economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Finance/Economics. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

Major banks linked to money laundering

The keywords are: leading investment banks - money laundering - susceptible to white-collar crime...

Major banks linked to money laundering

MICHAEL WEST

April 20, 2010

POLICE and corporate regulators have raided homes and businesses to smash a crime syndicate that launders money through the stockmarket after getting inside tip-offs from leading investment banks.

The crime ring, whose network extends from New South Wales to Western Australia, uses young people with little means to extract cash from ATMs after successful share trades executed through Commonwealth Bank's online broker, CommSec.

Police raided the homes of two Deutsche Bank employees on April 9 searching for email and phone records and documents in connection with the WA syndicate. They were searching for trades in brewer Lion Nathan before an $8 billion takeover bid by Japanese brewer Kirin.

Shares in Lion Nathan jumped from $8 to more than $11 in late April last year when the deal was announced, delivering a stellar profit to those who had bought shares before the announcement. Among those who profited are people with links to organised crime in WA.

Deutsche Bank is not suspected of any wrongdoing and is co-operating with authorities in the investigation. The bank was, on the same day as the raids, issued with a notice to produce information by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, with which it complied. The bank did not comment on the matter last night.

In late May last year, ASIC was alerted to suspicious trading in Caltex shares. Caltex's share price rose from $11 to $12 on news that it intended to buy Mobil's petrol stations.

Another leading investment bank has been the subject of preliminary ASIC inquiries over the Caltex trading but has not been issued with a notice to produce. One of its employees is alleged to have provided information to the syndicate about Caltex before the announcement.

The Caltex deal was later blocked on competition grounds but a taskforce from ASIC homed in on one $500,000-plus trade in which parties linked to the crime syndicate had benefited.

Sources said the syndicate members relied on young people to remit the cash by withdrawing $1000 amounts - the daily limit - from ATMs.

This was a method, said the source, of laundering money from illegal activities.

Spokespeople for CommSec and Deutsche Bank declined to comment about the investigation.

The trading in Lion and Caltex shares is one part of a wide-ranging investigation into insider trading in which several companies and individuals have been issued with notices to produce information. The crime syndicate is believed to have garnered trading tips from several sources and traded in a range of shares on the stock exchange.

The share trading has been conducted through what are thought to be fake company names along with fake names of individuals behind them.

Insider trading is notoriously hard to prove because stock tips are mostly provided by word of mouth and there is rarely a paper trail or recorded conversation to produce in evidence.

http://www.theage.com.au/business/major-banks-linked-to-money-laundering-20100419-spet.html

Tuesday, May 19, 2009

Accounting & Finance: An integrity or diversion?

Treatments of Employee options, Leases, and R&D costs are discussed by a finance professor.

Are accountants learning?

While I have many areas of disagreement with accounting, there are three accounting practices that I have taken particular issue with over time.

1. Not treating employee options as expenses when granted: There should really be no debate about this. Employee options are compensation, and like all other compensation expenses should be recorded at fair value, when granted. The fair value is the option value and not the exercise value.

2. Treating leases (or at least a significant portion of them) as operating expenses: Both FASB and IASB have used the ownership of the asset as the determinant of whether a lease should be treated as an operating or capital lease. As an earlier blog post noted, this allows retailers, restaurants and other big lessees to move most of their debt off the balance sheet.

3. Treating R&D expenses as operating, rather than capital expenses: Using the tenuous argument that the benefits of R&D are too uncertain, accountants have insisted on expensing R&D. In the process, they misstate earnings at technology and pharmaceutical firms and keep the most valuable assets of these firms off the books.

As recently as three years ago, all three practices were still entrenched in accounting statements and standards. But the times are changing. A couple of years ago, accounting finally came around to the point of view that employee options should be valued and expensed when granted (FASB 123). Now, there is chatter that accounting rules will be changed to force all leases to be treated as debt.
http://www.globest.com/news/1380_1380/insider/177832-1.html

I know that companies will be up in arms over this rule and that analysts will issue scary reports about how making this change will be devastating for companies. I don't think so, and have written what I hope is a comprehensive paper on what treating leases right (which to me is to treat them as debt) will do to all the numbers that we use in corporate finance and valuation. Since I have been treating all lease commitments as debt, in both my corporate finance and valuation classes, it will not change how I look at companies but it will surely make it easier for me to do so:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1390280

All that is left now is for the accounting rule makers to take a look at R&D and exploration costs and the logical fixes to make their treatment consistent with capital expenditures at other firms. I have mixed feelings about this happening. On the one hand, it will be a vindication of much of what I have been arguing for, over the last decade. On the other hand, what will I have left to argue about with my accounting colleagues? ASWATH DAMODARAN

Tuesday, December 16, 2008

No laughter into 2009

'No one will talk of EQ anymore. It will be EVA instead. Thinking outside the box will no longer be celebrated. Ticking the boxes will be.'

According to this article, HRD & CMO will be silently fading into the background while CFO is bound to be more indispensable despite putting up with steerage level of tight "financial leadership" and lingering in noncomfort zone. (EJ)

The year of the CFO

Economist, Nov 19th 2008
From The World in 2009 print edition
By Lucy Kellaway

Corporate life won't be funny

James Sillavan

PREPARE for the year of the finance director. In 2009 the world will find out just how bad corporate balance sheets really are, and companies—most of which escaped the early effects of the credit crunch—will start to find it trickier to raise money. Add to that the upward push in costs and downward slide in demand, and the chief financial officer (CFO) will be called upon to shore up the P&L too.

The implications of his ascendancy will be felt far beyond the figures and will last much longer than it takes to make them look healthy again. There will be a shift in the balance of power in the boardroom, which will affect how companies are managed, what it feels like to work in them, the culture of business and even its language.

For the past decade the prevailing wind in boardrooms has been gentle. Emotional intelligence and innovation have been what counted, and what leaders professed to value. But those ideas are all but finished. No one will talk of EQ ("emotional intelligence quotient") any more. It will be EVA ("economic value added") instead. Thinking outside the box (an over-rated activity at the best of times) will not be celebrated. Ticking boxes will be.

As financial skills are valued more highly, CFOs will make it to the corner office in greater numbers than before. Recession, credit crunch and the increasingly complex nature of global companies will all play directly into the bean counter's hands. Nominations committees will throw their trust behind the guy who has protected the creditworthiness of a company in hard times and won the trust of the market; they will pick him for the top slot rather than poaching an expensive star CEO from outside. This will be bad news for headhunters (who will vainly try to make good the shortfall by meddling in internal succession instead), but also bad news for CEOs' bank balances as top salaries will halt their ever-upward march.

Leadership style at the top will change. Big personalities have been out of fashion at the top for some years; in 2009 they will be more out than ever. However, egalitarianism and empowerment will also be on the way out; management by fiat is going to make a stealthy return.

In the boardrooms, the firm slap of leadership will be felt. "Execution" will no longer be a management fad, it will be a part of daily life. We will hear less of "vision" and much more of "value".

Goodbye "talent", hello "staff"

The biggest loser in the struggle for power will be the human resources director. In the past five years HR has been enjoying the greatest power it has ever had. The "war for talent", which companies have fought tooth and nail, will be over in 2008, neither lost nor won: there will be a ceasefire brought on by lack of funds and exhaustion of the troops. An old truth will be whispered by the brave: most workers are not terribly talented and most of them don't need to be, as most jobs don't require it. In 2009 a more elitist shift will occur: companies will worry about the performance of those at the top of the pyramid, while everyone else will be managed like a commodity. "Talent" will be a word we wave goodbye to. In 2009 the word "staff" will make a comeback, as will "headcount".

In this new world the HR director might just cling on to his title, but his job will be downgraded to personnel and in particular to payroll.

The marketing director will also lose out. He has already been kicked once by the decline of advertising and kicked again as the power of the internet has made his traditional tools useless. In 2009 his budgets will fall further, as will his status. As for the corporate-social-responsibility supremo, he will be told to take a gap year indefinitely.

Thinking outside the box (an over-rated activity at the best of times) will not be celebrated. Ticking boxes will be

The firm financial leadership will be welcome in that it will help companies survive, yet being a corporate foot-soldier in 2009 is not going to be enjoyable. Moaning will be on the rise as inexorably as expenses will be on the decline.

There will be less foreign travel, which will make work more efficient but duller. And there will be no more free champagne in first class—it will be steerage only. Expense-account lunches and subsidised health clubs will be slashed, and stationery cupboards will be thinly stocked.

One blessed thing will be cut: weekend offsite meetings in luxury hotels. Instead, if managers feel the need to bond at all it will be done more quickly over a cup of tea from the vending machine. There will be no more laughter workshops led by an outsourced facilitator—but then in the new world of 2009 there is not going to be a lot to laugh about.

Lucy Kellaway is a columnist at the Financial Times and author of "The Answers: All the Office Questions You Never Dared to Ask"



Tuesday, October 21, 2008

A Stiglitz Recipe to Survive the Crisis

Just as a cuisine recipe might not always translate into a real, intended piece of edible food being largely depending on the cook, an "economic nobel" recipe will likewise be not a guarantee to a factual relief. But at least we have the direction, the path towards the light of this hopefully not long dark tunnel of uncertainty. (EJ) 

Nobel Laureate: How to Get Out of the Financial Crisis

By Joseph Stiglitz Friday, Oct. 17, 2008

Specialist Thomas Laughlin works at his post on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange.
Specialist Thomas Laughlin works at his post on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange.
Richard / AP

The amount of bad news over the past weeks has been bewildering for many people in the world. Stock markets have plunged, banks have stopped lending to one another, and central bankers and treasury secretaries appear daily on television looking worried. Many economists have warned that we are facing the worst economic crisis the world has seen since 1929. The only good news is that oil prices have finally started to come down.

While these times are scary and strange for many Americans, a number of people in other countries feel a sense of deja vu. Asia went through a similar crisis in the late 1990s, and various other countries (including Argentina, Turkey, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Indonesia and South Korea) have suffered through banking crises, stock-market collapses and credit crunches.

Capitalism may be the best economic system that man has come up with, but no one ever said it would create stability. In fact, over the past 30 years, market economies have faced more than 100 crises. That is why I and many other economists believe that government regulation and oversight are an essential part of a functioning market economy. Without them, there will continue to be frequent severe economic crises in different parts of the world. The market on its own is not enough. Government must play a role.

It's good news that Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson seems to finally be coming around to the idea that the U.S. government needs to help recapitalize our banks and should receive stakes in the banks that it bails out. But more must be done to prevent the crisis from spreading around the world. Here's what it will take.

How We Got Here
The troubles we now face were caused largely by the combination of deregulation and low interest rates. After the collapse of the tech bubble, the economy needed a stimulus. But the Bush tax cuts didn't provide much stimulus to the economy. This put the burden of keeping the economy going on the Fed, and it responded by flooding the economy with liquidity. Under normal circumstances, it's fine to have money sloshing around in the system, since that helps the economy grow. But the economy had already overinvested, and so the extra money wasn't put to productive use. Low interest rates and easy access to funds encouraged reckless lending, the infamous interest-only, no-down-payment, no-documentation ("liar") subprime mortgages. It was clear that if the bubble got deflated even a little, many mortgages would end up under water — with the price less than the value of the mortgage. That has happened — 12 million so far, and more every hour. Not only are the poor losing their homes, but they are also losing their life savings.

The climate of deregulation that dominated the Bush-Greenspan years helped the spread of a new banking model. At its core was securitization: mortgage brokers originated mortgages that they sold on to others. Borrowers were told not to worry about paying the ever mounting debt, because house prices would keep rising and they could refinance, taking out some of the capital gains to buy a car or pay for a vacation. Of course, this violated the first law of economics — that there is no such thing as a free lunch. The assumption that house prices could continue to go up at a rapid pace looked particularly absurd in an economy in which most Americans were seeing their real incomes declining.

The mortgage brokers loved these new products because they ensured an endless stream of fees. They maximized their profits by originating as many mortgages as possible, with frequent refinancing. Their allies in investment banking bought them, sliced and diced the risk and then passed them on — or at least as much as they could. Our bankers forgot that their job was to prudently manage risk and allocate capital. They became gambling casinos — gambling with other people's money, knowing that the taxpayer would step in if the losses were too great. They misallocated capital, with massive amounts going into housing that was ultimately unaffordable. Loose money and light regulation were a toxic mixture. It exploded.

A Global Crisis
What made America's recklessness truly dangerous is that we exported it. A few months ago, some talked about decoupling — that Europe would carry on even as the U.S. suffered a downturn. I always thought that decoupling was a myth, and events have proven that right. Thanks to globalization, Wall Street was able to sell off its toxic mortgages around the world. It appears that about half the toxic mortgages were exported. Had they not been, the U.S. would be in even worse shape. Moreover, even as our economy went into a slowdown, exports kept the U.S. going. But the weaknesses in America weakened the dollar and made it more difficult for Europe to sell its goods abroad. Weak exports meant a weak economy, and so the U.S. exported our downturn just as earlier we had exported our toxic mortgages.

But now the problems are ricocheting back. The bad mortgages are contributing to forcing many European banks into bankruptcy. (We exported not only bad loans but also bad lending and regulatory practices; many of Europe's bad loans are to European borrowers.) And as market participants realized that the fire had spread from America to Europe, there was panic. Part of the concern is psychological. But part of it is because our financial and economic systems are closely intertwined. Banks all over the world lend and borrow from each other; they buy and sell complicated financial instruments — which is why bad regulatory practices in one country, leading to bad loans, can infect the global system.

How to Fix It
We are now facing a liquidity problem, a solvency problem and a macroeconomic problem. We are in the first phase of a downward spiral. It is, of course, part of the inevitable process of adjustment: returning housing prices to equilibrium levels and getting rid of the excessive leverage (debt) that had kept our phantom economy going.

Even with the new capital provided by the government, banks won't want to, or be able to, lend as much as they did in their reckless past. Homeowners won't want to borrow so much. Savings, which have been near zero, will go up — good for the economy in the long run but bad for an economy going into recession. While some large firms may be sitting on a bundle of cash, small firms depend on loans not just for investment but even for the working capital to keep going. That's going to be harder to come by. And the investment in real estate, which played such an important role in our modest growth of the past six years, has reached lows not seen in 20 years.

The Administration has veered from one half-baked solution to another. Wall Street panicked, but so did the White House, and in that panic, they had a hard time figuring out what to do. The weeks that Paulson and Bush spent pushing Paulson's orignal bailout plan — in the face of massive opposition — were weeks that could have been spent actually fixing the problem. At this point, we need a comprehensive approach. Another failed faint attempt could be disastrous. Here's a five-step, comprehensive approach:

1. Recapitalize banks. With all the losses, banks have insufficient equity. Banks will have a hard time raising this equity under current circumstances. The government needs to provide equity. In return, it should have voting stakes in the banks it helps. But equity injections also bail out bondholders. Right now the market is discounting these bonds, saying there is a high probability of default. There needs to be a forced conversion of this debt to equity. If this is done, the amount of government assistance that will be required will be much reduced.

It's good news that Treasury Secretary Paulson seems to finally realize that his original proposal of buying what he euphemistically called distressed assets was flawed. That Secretary Paulson took so long to figure this out is worrying. He was so bound by the idea of a free-market solution that he was unable to accept what economists of all stripes were telling him: that he needed to recapitalize the banks and provide new money to make up for the losses they incurred on their bad loans.

The Administration is now doing this, but three questions are raised: Was it a fair deal to the taxpayer? The answer to that seems fairly clear: taxpayers got a raw deal, evident by comparing the terms of Warren Buffet's injection of $5 billion into Goldman Sachs, and the terms extracted by the Administration. Second, is there enough oversight and restrictions to make sure that the bad practices of the past do not recur and that new lending does occur? Again, comparing the terms demanded by the U.K. and by the U.S. Treasury, we got the short end of the stick. For instance, banks can continue to pay out money to shareholders, as the government pours money in. Thirdly, is it enough money? The banks are so nontransparent that no one can fully answer the question, but what we do know is that the gaps in the balance sheet are likely to get bigger. That is because too little is being done about the underlying problem.

2. Stem the tide of foreclosures. The original Paulson plan is like a massive blood transfusion to a patient with severe internal hemorrhaging. We won't save the patient if we don't do something about the foreclosures. Even after congressional revisions, too little is being done. We need to help people stay in their homes, by converting the mortgage-interest and property-tax deductions into cashable tax credits; by reforming bankruptcy laws to allow expedited restructuring, which would bring down the value of the mortgage when the price of the house is below that of the mortgage; and even government lending, taking advantage of the government's lower cost of funds and passing the savings on to poor and middle-income homeowners.

3. Pass a stimulus that works. Helping Wall Street and stopping the foreclosures are only part of the solution. The U.S. economy is headed for a serious recession and needs a big stimulus. We need increased unemployment insurance; if states and localities are not helped, they will have to reduce expenditures as their tax revenues plummet, and their reduced spending will lead to a contraction of the economy. But to kick-start the economy, Washington must make investments in the future. Hurricane Katrina and the collapse of the bridge in Minneapolis were grim reminders of how decrepit our infrastructure has become. Investments in infrastructure and technology will stimulate the economy in the short run and enhance growth in the long run.

4. Restore confidence through regulatory reform. Underlying the problems are banks' bad decisions and regulatory failures. These must be addressed if confidence in our financial system is to be restored. Corporate-governance structures that lead to flawed incentive structures designed to generously reward ceos should be changed and so should many of the incentive systems themselves. It is not just the level of compensation; it is also the form — nontransparent stock options that provide incentives for bad accounting to bloat up reported returns.

5. Create an effective multilateral agency. As the global economy becomes more interconnected, we need better global oversight. It is unimaginable that America's financial market could function effectively if we had to rely on 50 separate state regulators. But we are trying to do essentially that at the global level.

The recent crisis provides an example of the dangers: as some foreign governments provided blanket guarantees for their deposits, money started to move to what looked like safe havens. Other countries had to respond. A few European governments have been far more thoughtful than the U.S. in figuring out what needs to be done. Even before the crisis turned global, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in his address to the U.N. last month, called for a world summit to lay the foundations for more state regulation to replace the current laissez-faire approach. We may be at a new "Bretton Woods moment." As the world emerged from the Great Depression and World War II, it realized there was need for a new global economic order. It lasted more than 60 years. That it was not well adapted for the new world of globalization has been clear for a long time. Now, as the world emerges from the Cold War and the Great Financial Crisis, it will need to construct a new global economic order for the 21st century, and that will include a new global regulatory agency.

This crisis may have taught us that unfettered markets are risky. It should also have taught us that unilateralism can't work in a world of economic interdependence.

Going Forward
The next U.S. President will have a very hard time of it. Even the most well-thought-out plans may not work as intended. But I am confident that a comprehensive program along the lines I have suggested — stemming foreclosures, recapitalizing banks, stimulating the economy, protecting the unemployed, shoring up state finances, providing guarantees where needed and appropriate, reforming regulations and regulatory structures and replacing regulators and those with responsibility to protect the economy with those focused more on rescuing the economy than on rescuing Wall Street — will not only restore confidence but in due time also enable America to live up to its full potential. Halfway approaches, on the other hand, by continually bringing disappointment, are sure to fail.

In a country where money is respected, Wall Street's leaders used to have our respect. They had our trust. They were believed to be a font of wisdom, at least on economic matters. Times have changed. Gone is the respect and trust. Too bad, because financial markets are necessary for a well-functioning economy. But most Americans believe that Wall Streeters are more likely to put their interests ahead of those of the rest of the country, dressing it up in as fancy language as necessary. If the next President is seen to have his policies unduly shaped by Wall Street and those policies don't do the trick, his honeymoon will be short. That will be bad news for him, for the country and for the world.

Nobel laureate (2001) Stiglitz is University Professor at Columbia University. He was chief economist of the World Bank and chairman of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers

Sumber: Time, 17 Oct 08

Tuesday, October 07, 2008

Back to Economics 101?

If only the basic economics works and all economics perpetrators stick to it... (EJ)

Economics 101 - What the global meltdown means

  • Steve Keen
  • October 6, 2008

IN MAY 2007, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) commented that "the current economic situation is in many ways better than what we have experienced in years. Our central forecast remains indeed quite benign".

Three months later, the financial crisis began: the US stockmarket started its long decline and house prices fell. Financial institutions began to resemble tenpins rather than the pillars of society they had once been.

G4 leaders stop short of bailout

European leaders vow to help banks out at the end of an emergency summit in France to try to shore up confidence in the banking system.

A year later, the crisis has become even more extreme, with five more large international banks failing the weekend the US
Government devised a $US700 billion ($897 billion) bailout plan, only to have it rejected by Congress.

WHAT CAUSED THE CRISIS?

The immediate cause was the collapse in American house prices, which had doubled between January 2000 and August 2006, and have since fallen by 20%. More than 1% of American households have defaulted on their mortgages.

Up to a quarter of mortgages were "subprime", and fi nanced by the issuing of "residential mortgage-backed securities" rather than by traditional bank loans. The bonds were then sold to investors, pension funds and councils all over the world. Those buyers have since lost not just their anticipated interest but also much of their principal.

The bonds were also used by lenders to raise money through repo agreements - a contract in which one finance company sells another a bond in return for cash, and is then obligated to buy the same bond. By August 2007, so many households
had defaulted that the bond prices began to plunge, and suddenly lenders refused to accept them as collateral for loans.

The wholesale money market collapsed, and the credit crunch began. The long-term cause of the crisis was the dramatic growth in private debt in America - from a low of 37% of GDP in 1945 to 290% now - and across the OECD. The subprime fiasco was the final stage in a process that has seen lending extended to progressively riskier and less viable borrowers.

This final lending spree drove both stock and house prices to historically unprecedented levels, from which they are now falling, bankrupting both borrowers and lenders.

WHY DOES IT MATTER THAT THESE SUBPRIME BONDS ARE WORTHLESS?

The long-term problem is that buyers of these bonds are getting far lower returns than they expected from their investments. The money they used to buy the bonds has essentially been lost. They will have far less income - and far less capital - than they had anticipated and may face bankruptcy.

The more immediate problem is that, when the financial bubble was at its biggest, these bonds were the mainstay of the repo trade. Now no one wants to buy a bond in case the seller is unable to buy it back as promised. The repo market has
therefore dried up, and the bonds are effectively worthless.

However, many financial institutions still record the value of these bonds at the original sale price - their nominal or "book value" - rather than their market value.

If they were instead valued at what they could be sold for now, next to nothing, the recorded value of those companies' assets would fall, making them effectively insolvent and unable to lend. Their managers live in dread of some event forcing
them to do that - such as a distress sale by a company trying to avoid bankruptcy.

This is why the US rescue plan was devised: to buy these toxic bonds, euphemistically called "troubled assets", before the
fi nancial institutions were forced to value them.

If a global recession results from this crisis, it would be diffi cult for us to avoid a recession here as well.

WHAT IS THE US RESCUE PLAN?

The plan involves the US treasury buying up to $US700 billion worth of "troubled assets" from financial institutions, then covering that cost by selling $US700 billion in new government bonds to the public.

SO WOULD THE PLAN WORK?

That's very hard to say, but the details are not promising. This is a rescue plan devised by people who didn't see the crisis coming in the first place - otherwise they would never have allowed subprime loans to be created. If they didn't understand
the problem with subprimes, then it's possible they don't understand the system they're now trying to rescue.

Even the amount nominated, almost US$150 billion more than the US has spent on the war in Iraq, was not chosen in any scientific way. A US treasury spokeswoman told Forbes magazine: "It's not based on any particular data point. We just wanted to choose a really large number."

There's also the problem of how much the plan would pay for these toxic bonds. The initial proposal was to set the price through a "reverse auction": start by offering a low purchase price, and progressively increase it until individual financial
corporations decide to sell.

However, this could result in sales by more solvent firms at prices that would bankrupt less solvent ones, so it is likely that this, and many other, aspects of the plan will change in time - if it is passed into law by Congress.

If the US financial system is to continue, then the assets of financial institutions must be increased - and this bailout would enable them to replace some of their impaired assets with $US700 billion in cash. But this could still cause a significant fall in their assets, depending on the sale price. And the book value of outstanding mortgage debt is $US14 trillion. With mortgage defaults at unprecedented levels and still on the rise, there's no guarantee the plan is big enough to succeed.

SO HOW DOES ALL THIS AFFECT AUSTRALIA?

In our globalised fi nancial system, crises anywhere can cause ructions elsewhere. Banks and investors throughout the world hold CDOs linked to the American crisis, so that bankruptcies in the US can damage the financial security of a municipal council in Australia.

ARE COMPARISONS WITH THE GREAT DEPRESSION JUSTIFIED?

The real comparison now is with the financial crisis that preceded the Great Depression, centred on the stockmarket collapse of 1929. Then, despite a 36% fall in the share index that year, all the Wall Street merchant banks made it through
the Great Depression.

This time, all fi ve Wall Street behemoths have either failed (Lehman Brothers), been taken over at bargain-basement prices
(Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch), or have sought to change their status to that of commercial banks before they failed (Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs). And the expected economic downturn has only begun. So the financial crisis is much worse than in 1929.

So is the level of private debt. When the 1929 crisis began, America's private debt was equivalent to 1.5 years of the nation's GDP.

It is now equivalent to 2.9 years of GDP - and that doesn't include the net debt involved in the $US500 trillion derivatives market. So the debt situation is almost twice as bad.

One attenuating factor is that the US is not as economically dominant as in the 1920s, and the emerging economies of China and India may counteract America's downturn.

But the US is still the world's largest economy, and many other OECD nations are as indebted as the US. How the now widely expected economic downturn compares to the Great Depression remains to be seen.

Associate Professor Steve Keen is from the school of economics and finance at the University of Western Sydney.

http://www.theage.com.au/national/education/economics-101--what-the-global-meltdown-means-20081006-4urk.html?page=-1

Friday, September 26, 2008

walking down the bank route...

Aswath Damodaran is the author of Corporate Finance: Theory & Practice, one of the required textbooks used in my 'university' days and one that I found very contentful. This piece is from his blog. /  EJ
 
The End of Investment Banking?
Aswath Damodaran
 
* 22-Sep-08 *  THE BIG NEWS of the morning is that Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley will reorganize themselves as bank holding companies, thus ending a decades-long experiment with stand-alone public investment banking. Before we buy into the hyperbole that this represents the end of of investment banking as we know it, it behooves to us to look both back in time and into the future and examine the implications. 
 
Independent investment banks have been in existence for a long time, but for much of their existence, they were private partnerships that made the bulk of their profits from transactions and as advisors. They seldom put their own capital at risk, largely because they had so little to begin with and it was their own money (partners). Part of the impetus in their going public was the need to raise more capital, which in turn, freed them to indulge in more capital-intensive businesses including proprietary trading. That model worked well for much of the last two decades, but three things (in my view) destroyed it.
 
The first was that it became easier to access low cost, short term debt (especially in the last few years) to fund the capital bets that these firms were making, whether in mortgage backed securities or in other investments. The second was that the compensation structure at investment banks encouraged bad risk-taking, since it rewarded risk-takers for upside gains (extraordinary bonuses tied to trading profits) and punished them inadequately for the downside (at worst, you lost your job but you were not required to disgorge bonuses in prior years... in many cases, finding another trading job on the Street or at a hedge fund was not difficult to do even for the most egregious violators). The third was a patchwork of government regulation that was often exploited by investors to make risky bets and to pass the risk on elsewhere, while pocketing the returns. The combination worked in deadly fashion these last two years to devastate the capital bases at these institutions. Lehman, Bear Stearns and Merrill have fallen...
 
So, what will change now that Goldman and Morgan Stanley have chosen the bank route? The plus is that it opens more sources of long term capital since they can now attract deposits from investors. Having never done this before, they start off at a disadvantage. The minus is that they will now be covered by banking regulation, where the equity capital they be required to have will be based upon the risk of their investments. This will effectively mean that they will need more equity capital, if they want to keep taking high risk investments, or that they will have to bring down the risk exposure on their investments. My guess is that they would have gone down one of these roads anyway. In pragmatic terms, it will also mean that their returns on equity at investment banks will drop to banking levels - more in the low teens than in the low twenties. I think the stock prices for both investment banks already reflects this expectation.
 
Ultimately, Goldman and Morgan Stanley have sent a signal to the market that they are willing to accept a more restrictive risk taking system. In today's market, that may be the best signal to send. There will be times in the future, where I am sure that they will regret the restrictions that come with this signal, but they had no choice. (http://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com/2008/09/end-of-investment-banking.html)